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The Possibilities and Limits of Decision Theory in
Antitrust: A Response to Professor Horowitz
JOSEPH F. BRODLEY*
In his stimulating and original paper Professor Horowitz proposes to in-
troduce a scientific approach into the decisionmaking process of the Justice
Department's Antitrust Division. The vehicle for change is rigorous applica-
tion of decision theory analysis (DTA) to guide decisions in both individual
cases and in the operation of the agency as a whole. The proposal is for a
thoroughgoing quantification of the decisional process and would require ex-
act specification of payoffs, decisional sequences and probabilities. Optimal
use of relevant information would be insured by use of Bayesian techniques,1
and the general result would be to elevate the role and status of economists.
The proposal is urged as a rationalization of limited antitrust resources and
as a means to a more effective realization of antitrust values.
It is hard to disagree with the general thrust and motivation of a pro-
posal to introduce rationalization and longer range planning into a decision-
making process which by most reports is not excessively burdened by those
*'rofessor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington. I have profited from comments by
Professors Bruce L. Jaffe, Alan Schwartz and Robert L. Winkler on a draft of this paper (re-
maining errors are mine), and from research assistance by Hugh Sanders. An earlier version was
presented before the Society of Government Economists in Atlantic City, N.J., on September 16,
1976.
'Bayesian technique is a quantitative method of revising judgmental probabilities based on
experience or observation. While we normally do this intuitively, experiment reveals bias and
systematic underassessment of probabilities when non-quantitative methods are used. See
Horowitz, Decision Theory and Antitrust: Quantitative Evaluation for Efficient Enforcement, 52
IND. L.J. 716, 726 n. 36 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Decision Theory and AntitrustJ. The example
suggested by Professor Horowitz concerns the negative inference antitrust policy draws from high
concentration. An analyst using Bayesian method would begin by assuming an initial probability
that high concentration leads to anticompetitive behavior; but this would be subject to systematic
revision based on observations of actual market behavior in the particular-case. The revised pro-
bability of anticompetitive behavior might vary drastically from the beginning probability depen-
ding on the character of the subsequent information. See Decision Theory and Antitrust, supra,
at 713-14 n. 40. See also H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS 17-19, 124-27 (1968). Bayesian techniques
are an important tool in decision theory analysis.
Decision theory analysis is more than a method of assessing probabilities; it is a quan-
titative method for combining probabilities and payoffs or returns from policy alternatives to
assure optimal policy choice based on the information available. The analytic notation used to
work out this analysis, which can be complex, is known as a decision tree, in which the various
forks indicate decisional alternatives or events, and probabilities and payoffs are affixed to the
identified alternatives. Though developed originally to assist decisionmaking in business, decision
theory has been applied to a wide variety of social choice problems. See C. KELLY & C. PETER.
SON, DECISION THEORY RESEARCH, TECHNICAL REPORT DT/TR 75-5 (Off. Naval Research 1975).
For a general introduction to decision theory analysis and Bayesian methods see H. RAIFFA, DEcI.
SION ANALYSIS (1968). For an application to governmental economic regulation see R. Park, A
Bayesian Framework for Thinking about the Role of Analysis, in THE ROLE OF ANALYSIS IN
REGULATORY DECISION MAKING (R. Park ed. 1972).
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characteristics. 2 In presenting his carefully developed proposal Professor
Horowitz necessarily confronts us with some basic questions concerning the
use of DTA in legal-economic policymaking. Is DTA an appropriate analytic
tool for formulation of antitrust policy either in specific cases or for the en-
forcement agency as a whole? If it is, are there nevertheless limits as to how
far or how rigorously it can be pursued?
Advantageously, and in contrast to other attempts, the Horowitz proposal
is aimed at an opportune point for DTA entry into legal decisionmaking; it
would impact at the highly discretionary level of enforcement decision, where
there is the least barrier to the use of new decisional methods. As an enforce-
ment agency, the Antitrust Division is traditionally accorded wide discretion
in its judgments. Moreover, its decisional processes are for the most part con-
fidential. By contrast, when judicial decisionmaking is involved, additional
constraints operate. Courts must make their decisional methods explicit and
public; for the judicial task is not only to make correct judgments but to en-
sure so far as possible that the public understands and supports its decisions.
Thus, it would be far more difficult to introduce DTA into judicial decision-
making than into the internal decisional system of the Antitrust Division.
3
Moreover, DTA methods may help to correct a serious planning bias that
besets many on the legal staffs of government agencies: short term tenure.
This causes an especially wide gap between personal incentives, which
necessarily operate in the short run, and longer term agency goals. Under
these conditions one would expect a tendency to underestimte future costs
and benefits that would not be present in decisionmaking by officials who
knew that they would have to see a decision through from start to finish.4 To
the extent DTA compels more careful consideration of distant costs and
benefits, it reinforces considerations that might otherwise be seriously
underassessed.
More generally, Professor Horowitz issues a healthy challenge to the legal
profession to consider more carefully the place of quantitative methods in
legal decisionmaking. Not only antitrust decisions but legal decisions general-
ly can be described in Professor Horowitz's words as "a compound decision
problem under uncertainty." Moreover, quantitative methods compel
2See Posner, A Program for the Antitrust Division, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 536 (1971). A re-
cent review of scholarly efforts to discover the economic criteria for bringing cases could not be
characterized in economic terms, Asch, The Determinants and Effects of Antitrust Activity, 18 J.
L. & EcON. 575, 580-81 (1975). See alsoJOINT ECON. COMM., ANTITRUST LAW AND ADMINISTRATION:
A SURVEY OF CURRENT ISSUES, 94th Cong. 2d Sess, 18-19 (1976).3The objection to the use of quantitative methods in judicial decisionmaking, especially by
juries, is articulated in Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Pro-
cess, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971). By contrast there is ample precedent for use of DTA in ex-
ecutive agency policymaking. See C. KELLY & C. PETERSON, DECISION THEORY RESEARCH,
TECHNICAL REPORT DT/TR 75-5 (Off. Naval Research. 1975).
4Long term officials may have other kinds of biases, e.g., excessive concern to avoid con-
troversy.
sDecision Theory and Antitrust, supra note 1, at 722 . See Nagel & Neff. Plea Bargain-
ing, Decision Theory, and Equilibrium Models: Part II, 52 IND. L.J. 1 (1976).
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disciplined articulation and evaluation of policy goals and alternatives, pro-
viding a powerful antidote to decision by default. Yet despite the growing use
of DTA and other quantitative methods in government, there has been, at
best, sluggish response by the legal profession. Lawyers should reflect more on
the potential of such methods.
CRITIQUE OF THE PROPOSAL
The little progress that legal analysis has made in adapting quantitative
methods is due only in part to its own resistance. It is ilso caused by the in-
herent difficulty of bridging disparate modes of thought. That the bridge put
down by Professor Horowitz is subject t6 criticisms and suggestions for
modification in no way detracts from the originality and value of his overall
thrust. Therefore, it is in a constructive sense that I take exception to certain
features of the Horowitz proposal, particularly its treatment of antitrust values
and its view of legal rules and process.
Transformation of Antitrust Values
The purpose of introducing DTA into antitrust decisionmaking is to max-
imize achievement of antitrust values. Specification of values is crucial where
precise quantitative expression replaces more intuitive approaches since values
unspecified can be assigned no weight. One may acknowledge the point and
still question why it is necessary to focus on any particular system of values
since DTA appears to be value neutral, posing no barrier in theory to the
substitution of an entirely different set of values. The reason is that an
analytic method can shape as well as reflect values. 6 Thus, as proponents of
DTA have themselves cautioned, the technique lends itself better to the
representation of some types of values than others. 7
The antitrust values or goals identified by Professor Horowitz are in some
respects narrower and in other respects broader than most prior formulations.
They are narrower in their focus on economic performance as the single goal
of antitrust policy. They are broader in defining economic performance to in-
clude much more than efficiency and maximization of output, but indeed to
encompass such far ranging macroeconomic criteria as income inequity,
unemployment, inflation, economic growth, working conditions and the
balance of payments. This is an expression of antitrust values very far from
existing judicial formulations, which not only have failed to mention most of
the Horowitz performance variables, but have included other criteria which
Horowitz omits. More specifically, the present values promoted by antitrust
6See Brodley, Massive Industrial Size, Classical Economics and the Search for Humanistic
Value, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1155, 1170-71 (1972).7Brown, Do Managers Find Decision Theory Useful? 44 HARV. Bus. REV. 78, 88 (May
-June 1970).
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are all micro-oriented. They include "hard" variables such as economic effi-
ciency and maximization of output, 8 and also "softer" variables, i.e. promo-
tion of private, decentralized decision, confinement of discretionary economic
authority, equality of business opportunity and (less frequently) local control
of industry. 9
What Horowitz has done is to incorporate the "hard" micro-values and
then to substitute for the softer micro-values a broad array of macro-values.
It is striking that the common property of almost all the values Horowitz in-
cludes is that they are capable of expression in monetary terms. Yet at the
same time there is no demonstration based on accepted economic theory or
concrete illustration as to how the impact of antitrust policy on such macro-
economic values is to be measured.
Critics of quantitative methods in legal analysis have charged that there is
a tendency for such methods to drive out soft values in favor of hard, 10 and a
leading DTA writer reminds us that difficulty in assessment of non-monetary
criteria is one of the technique's weaknesses." One can fairly ask whether the
Horowitz development is an illustration of just such phenomenon, in which
an analytic system induces those value formulations that it most readily
measures.1
2
Neglect of Conditions for an Effective Legal Rule
Most essentially decision theory analysis is designed to lead to a more
systematic expression of probabilities and payoffs (costs and benefits) and, by
combining them into a single expected value, to permit a more rational
choice to be made between alternative courses of action. When this method is
applied to the legal process, there is an additional constraint not present in
other uses that must be satisfied: the decisional method must be capable of
incorporation into an effective legal rule. An effective legal rule, particularly
in antitrust, means a rule that can be readily understood and complied with,
'See Connell Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U.S. 616, 623 (1975).
'See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 283 (1966) (Stewart, dissenting);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1945); Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. - U.S. - n. 21 (1977). See generally Hofstadter, What
Happened to the Antitrust Movement, in THE BusINEss ESTABLISHMENT.113-151 (E. Cheit ed.
1964).
"OSee Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L.
REv. 1329, 1361-2 (1971). Cf. H. RAIFFA, DEcISION ANALYSIS 272 (1968).
"See Brown, Do Managers Find Decision Theory Useful? 48 HARV. Bus. REv. 78, 88 (May
- June 1970).
12It is by no means impossible to argue that the Horowitz substitution is justified as a more
effective expression of the value objectives of antitrust. The fault in the Horowitz development,
and the more general problem it illustrates, is that the substitution is made sub silentio. The
lesson is that in any actual application of DTA to legal decisionmaking we should be highly sen-
sitive to whether in the specification of values to be included in the system a transformation
rather than a mere translation has occurred.
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or, put another way, in which the judicial result is reasonably predictable.' 3
To ascertain whether the Horowitz system meets this constraint it is
necessary to determine the extent of the change he is proposing-apart from
the change resulting from quantification of the expected value function in-
herent in any DTA system. Alternatives in decision theory are assessed in
terms of "expected value." This is a function of probability and "bottom line"
payoff. Determination of each may pose difficulties in a legal setting..
The payoff from a particular enforcement decision is simply the sum of
the costs and benefits. As previously indicated, Horowitz proposes a striking
departure by including an array of macroeconomic performance criteria in
addition to more conventional antitrust micro-criteria. Even if one accepts
these as appropriate indicators, it is clear that they are quite unsuitable for
either courtroom or enforcement agency use. As previously stated, there is lit-
tle if any economic theory or empirical evidence as to how antitrust policy
relates in any measurable way to criteria such as income inequality or the
balance of payments. This is scarcely surprising when even determination of
relatively limited micro-effects of antitrust policies, e.g. economic efficiency,
is fraught with difficulty. Not that Professor Horowitz is unaware of this; he
recognizes that adoption of his program would "greatly expand the informa-
tional demands that are made upon economic science."' 4
What he neglects, however, is the impossible task his system would place
on legal compliance. Imagine a lawyer trying to advise a firm whether there
is significant risk of prosecution as to a proposed business transaction based
on the Horowitz criteria. Moreover, to the extent the criteria become deci-
sional factors in the cases, the problem is compounded. Even simple issues
become difficult in protracted antitrust litigation. Complex issues become im-
possible. 15 It is no accident that the history of enforcement success in antitrust
is largely the history of its presumptive and per se rules.' 6
The problem is reduced but by no means eliminated if the criteria are
used only in making enforcement decisions. Much, perhaps most, legal advice
"Given limited enforcement resources, huge financial' stakes and'skilled and tenacious
litigants, legal rules that are not clear and apparent in meaning will receive little enforcement.
See Brodley, The Legal Status of Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: A Summary Assess-
ment, 21 ANTITRusT BULL. 453, 464 (1976) (courts found joint ventures unlawful only where per se
violation). It is sometimes forgotten that most enforcement takes place not in the courtroom but in
lawyers' offices when clients are advised. If the lawyer cannot give a clear and decisive prediction of
legality or prosecution risk, highly profitable transactions will be little deterred. Thus, simple rules
are the key to enforcement success. This is the essential justification of legal rules which seem to
violate the DTA canon of taking into account all relevant facts, e.g. the per se rules against price fix-
ing and other practices.
"Decision Theory and Antitrust, supra note 1, at 731.
"See ANTITRusT IN ACTION, TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC (oMMI=TEE, MONOGRAPH
No 16, at 60 (1941). See also Brodley, Industrial Concentration and Legal Feasibility: The Effi-
ciencies Defense, 9J. ECON. IssuEs 365-67 (1975).
'
6Cf G. STIGLER. THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 270-71 (1968). See JOINT ECON. COMM.,
ANTITRUST LAW AND ADMINISTRATION: A SURvEY OF CURRENT IssuEs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 17-18
(1976).
1977]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
to business is with a view to avoiding prosecution or civil action altogether.
Even if the outcome of litigation is favorable, it will exact large costs, par-
ticularly in terms of that scarce and extremely valuable resource-time and
attention of executive personnel. If the enforcement agency in fact uses the
Horowitz criteria in its enforcement decisions, sophisticated counsel (and the
incentive for sophistication in antitrust is very high) will necessarily have to
make similar assessments. But since the criteria are elusive in application
predictability will again be low. However, to the extent that enforcement of-
ficials are presently using these criteria informally, as Horowitz suggests,
quantitative expression would be an improvement.17
More closely approximating the present practice is Horowitz's procedure
for determining the probability of antitrust violation.18 In agreement with ex-
isting law Horowitz would find highly concentrated markets to be most
susceptible to anticompetitive conduct, e.g. collusion. But for Horowitz this is
only an opening assumption (a "prior probability" in Bayesian terms) subject
to revision based on evidence of actual market conduct and performance.
The latter evidence, or more exactly the probability that anticompetitive or
deficient conduct and performance has or will occur (the "posterior pro-
bability" in Bayesian terms) modifies the opening assumption (or probability).
This leads to a revised probability of antitrust violation, which, as Horowitz
demonstrates, can be strikingly different than the opening probability.' 9
In fact this is a fairly good model of the present rule for corporate
mergers. In both Marine Bancorporation20 and General Dynamics21 the
Supreme Court used concentration data only as an opening assumption of an-
titrust violation. 2 This was subject to revision based on actual evidence of
conduct, and by implication, economic performance as well. 2 Thus, the pro-
bability assessment part of the Horowitz proposal, as distinct from its payoff
values, can be defended as a Bayesian formalization of present practice,
utilizing no new substantive factors.
While in my opinion the judicial process cannot effectively handle com-
plex rules which rest on difficult issues of economic conduct and perfor-
"Objection might be raised as to the legitimacy of a practice of making enforcement deci-
sions on the basis of policy values unrecognized in either legislative or judicial expressions, and
the decibel level of the critics' voices would no doubt rise as the assessment became more explicit.
Perhaps for this reason the enforcement policy would not in fact diverge over any extended
period from judicial policy. See notes 29-32 infra & text accompanying.
"See Decision Theory and Antitrust, supra note 1, at 722-29, 731-32.
"Decision Theory and Antitrust, supra note 1, at 728-29.
"United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
"United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
"Horowitz would use certain factors additional to market concentration in defining suspect
market structure, e.g. number of firms, extent of vertical integration. See Decision Theory and
Antitrust, supra note 1, at 730-31.
"United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 630 (1974) ("parallelism" of
behavior); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 492-94 (1974) (market condi-
tions). See United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
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mance, 24 one cannot fault their inclusion so long as present Supreme Court
doctrine stands. In point of fact, however, the Horowitz policy toward
mergers and other market concentration problems turns out to be closer to
Warren Court than to Burger Court views. That this is so is both interesting
and revealing of DTA methodology.
As indicated above, DTA decisions are made in terms of expected values.
Expected value is simply the result of multiplying anticipated payoff by pro-
bability of occurrence. While the Horowitz methodology would reduce the
probability magnitude drawn from concentration standing alone, it would
also increase the payoffs assigned to antitrust actions against "the major firms
in major [concentrated] industries", 25 since, as Horowitz notes, this is clearly
where the large macroeconomic effects will occur. One may fairly question
whether the diminished probability multiplied by the enhanced payoffs, given
the inherent inexactitude of these factors, will lead to any very different result
than the older Warren Court assumption based on market structure alone. If
not, we will have added fearsome complexity for little purpose.
A better strategy for developing effective legal doctrine in antitrust is to
formulate simple rules that give adequate expression to the multi-value system
of the law.2 6 The question for the legal strategist seeking to implement the
Horowitz goals would be how closely it might be possible to effectuate them
by legal rules which meet the simplicity criterion.
This raises the question whether existing policies rigorously pursued, in-
cluding the use of DTA analysis where helpful, would not approach essential-
ly the same goals. This is to suggest that a focusing of enforcement effort on
the reduction and limitation of economic concentration and the deterrence of
anticompetitive practices in concentrated markets might bring us very close to
where Professor Horowitz wishes to take us. His response might be that this
would condemn to the antitrust fires some efficiency-creating, and otherwise
economically desirable, transactions. But such an objection can be met by
imposing an efficiency constraint on enforcement policy so that a showing of
really significant efficiency loss would be a reason to exercise discretion not to
prosecute.2 7 Better yet, legal rules against concentration and anticompetitive
practices could so far as possible be drawn with sufficient narrowness to avoid
undue risk of efficiency loss. 2 8 That might not lead all the way to Horowitz's
21See Brodley, Potential Competition Merger: A Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L.J. (forth-
coming) [hereinafter cited as Structural Synthesis].25Decision Theory and Antitrust, supra note 1, at 731.
26See Structural Theory, supra note 24.
27Admittedly this is not free of complexity, but it seems of lower magnitude. See Brodley,
Industrial Concentration and Legal Feasibility: The Efficiencies Defense, 9 J. ECON. IssuES 365
(1975). See generally Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L.
REV. 699 (1977). Such a constraint would also not bar private actions, but they would be
adversely affected since they would not be able to proceed on the strength of prior government
prosecution.
20See Structural Synthesis, supra note 24.
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production possibility frontier for antitrust, but it would seem to move in the
right direction.
Diminished Role of Lawyers
Professor Horowitz is not easy on lawyers and they probably richly merit
his criticism. Nevertheless, the particular indictment he brings seems more an
objection to the nature of the legal process than to lawyers. Horowitz would
rigorously separate the conduct of trials from the selection of antitrust goals,
a matter "too important to be turned over to lawyers." 29 The trouble with
lawyers seems to be tunnel vision. They make policy decisions purely on the basis
of whether they can develop a good case and get a conviction. In so doing they
neglect the more rational and considered pursuit of antitrust goals which
Horowitz advocates. Moreover, their condition is beyond repair; for this
reason Horowitz does not urge that they be reeducated in DTA technology so
that they too might learn to consider decisional sequences, payoffs and pro-
babilities. He knows, after eighteen months of experience at the Antitrust
Division, that lawyers are incurable addicts of judicial doctrine. While he
perceives their habit, he misunderstands the inducement.
The tenacity with which lawyers urge vigorous pursuit of legal doctrines
to which economists sometimes object, and which in any event often appear
vague to the naked eye, is not based on sheer perversity. Rather, it reflects an
allegiance to the rule of law, and an assertion of the special role of the
lawyer. What after all is the measure of excellence in a government lawyer or
judge? Most fundamentally, it is a sensitive appreciation of the underlying
values that the people, through their legislatures and courts, have sought to
incorporate into rules of law, accompanied by an analytic rigor and devotion
in interpreting and applying the rules in specific situations. Thus, the govern-
ment lawyer urges prosecution of serious law violation not because it offends
his own scheme of values, but because it offends society's values expressed in
its laws. Of these laws the lawyer is guardian. If he is tenacious, it is because
he realizes that society has placed on him the highest obligation to defend the
rule of law. The process is sometimes misunderstood because a full consisten-
cy and symmetry of values is never possible; the resolution of great issues such
as the direction of antitrust policy has inevitably been the result of com-
promise between competing interests. The tasks of the lawyers and judge then
becomes acutely difficult, but it remains one of endeavoring to give faithful
expression to the general will. This explains, for example, a decision such as
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 30 which articulated multiple and
not entirely symmetrical values.3 1 Judge Learned Hand, who wrote the opi-
'29 Decision Theory and Antitrust, supra note 1, at 730.
30148 F.2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1945).
3 The opinion asserts the value of economic performance, industrial decentralization and
small business opportunity.
[Vol. 52:735
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nion, was not economically naive; it was rather that he was faithfully attemp-
ting to give expression to the compromise of values in the Sherman Antitrust
Act.32
One can object to those values, and such objections can be pursued in
the Congress or by the Antitrust Division through occasional litigation in-
itiatives to obtain new judicial interpretations. But most of the work of the
Division should clearly be to give faithful expression to the existing legal doc-
trine, apart from which there is no legitimate system of antitrust values.
This does not by any means preclude the use of decision theory in an-
titrust enforcement. Choices must still be made; some cases and programs
must be given priority over others. In making such choices, decision theory
can be helpful, but clearly adherence to and conscientious enforcement of ex-
isting legal doctrine cannot be excluded as a prime decisional value.
Subordination of Legal to Economic Values
The Horowitz proposal is ingeniously constructed to subordinate legal or
judicial values to economic goals in antitrust decisionmaking. This is done by
placing an additional variable at the end of the decision tree, after the
judicial finding of guilt or innocence, which Horowitz designates as "V" and
describes as the actuality that an anticompetitive act did occur no matter
what a court may have found. Similarly, "P(V)" is the probability that such
an act occurred, which is to be distinguished from "P(G)", the probability of
a judicial finding of violation. The inclusion of these variables, to which
weights and probabilities would be assigned, may seem plausbile, since courts
do sometimes make decisions injurious to competition. In fact, use of the "V"
and "P(V)" variables in agency decisionnaking would significantly distort
antitrust policy.
It is one thing to include economic effects in the estimate of costs and
benefits of agency action. It is something else to construct an ultimate
economic effects value function quite at variance with that contained in
judicial decisions. What is afoot becomes clear as soon as one asks what is the
criterion of an actual anticompetitive act (the "V" function) and who is to be
the final arbiter. The standard is stated obscurely as that of an "omniscient
jurist," but there is no doubt as to who is to render the ultimate judgment. It
is to be the economist.3 3 Thus, the "V" value function reduces to a systematic
means of permitting purely economic values to dominate legal. To be sure,
even Horowitz stops short of a full subordination of the judicial process to
economic goals by conceding that in those cases where challenged conduct
constitutes a per se violation the probability of an actual anticompetitive act
3Judge Hand was acknowledged to be a master at fathoming legislative.and societal values.
See H. SHANKS. THE ART AND CRAFT OFJUDGING THE DEcISIONS OF JUDGE LEARNED HAND 157-59
(1968).
35Decision Theory and Antitrust, upra note 1, at 732.
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is to be raised to unity, i.e. taken as certain.3 4 But in other cases the system is
constructed to permit the economist's definition of an anticompetitive act to
dominate decisionmaking.
The trouble with this scheme is that it is in derogation of the judicial and
legislative powers. Our system recognizes no ultimate legal standard beyond
what a court of final authority resolves. The responsibility of economists or
anyone else who disagrees with a rule of law is not to base enforcement deci-
sions on their own preferred value system but to present their differing ideas
to a court or legislature to induce a change in law. If existing lawyer-staffed
courts are thought to be inadequate to the complex economic task of
rulemaking in economic regulation, the appropriate response is to seek
legislative amendment to add economists to courts, or even to constitute a
court composed entirely of economists. If this has not been d ne, there may
be a reason connected with the sentiments of the people.
A MORE LIMITED APPROACH
A recent review of the work of the Antitrust Division suggested significant
change in priorities and resource allocations, but explicitly rejected a quan-
titative approach to decisionmaking as exceeding present knowledge;35 but
this may be unduly pessimistic. On the other hand Professor Horowitz, while
greatly facilitating analysis by outlining a comprehensive DTA system, has
probably moved too far in the quantitative direction. Moreover, by incor-
porating substantive changes in decisional standards in his proposed system,
Horowitz has taken on unnecessary as well as highly controversial baggage.
Introducing DTA methods into the decisionmaking apparatus of an organiza-
tion is itself the result of a decision, and, quite logically, DTA analysts
sometimes speak of assessing its costs and benefits.3 6 Surely, for many, the
costs of introducing decision theory into the processes of the Antitrust Divi-
sion would be reduced if such efforts adhered as closely as possible to existing
legal values, imperfect though they may be. Moreover, to anticipate sudden
global change in decisionmaking process seems infeasible as well as excessively
disruptive. There is need, therefore, to specify some limited first steps.
First, a small number of cases might be selected for DTA experimenta-
tion.3 7 This should be done only with the consent of the lawyers involved, as
their cooperation is obviously essential. Various degrees of decision theory
41d. at 732.
"
5Posner, A Program for the Antitrust Division, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 500 (1971). The thrust
of his proposal is that the Division should concentrate on efficiency-maximizing goals, determin-
ing these by general microeconomic reasoning. This would result, he suggests, in concentration of
enforcement resources on (1) cartel cases, (2) patent cases, and (3) promoting competition in the
regulated industries.
"
6See R. BROWN & S. WATSON. ISSUES IN THE VALUE OF DECISION ANALYSIS, DDI TECHNICAL
REPORT 75-79 (Off. Naval Research 1975) [on file at the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL].
"See generally id.
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analysis might then be introduced, in some cases not going beyond a concep-
tual tree, 38 which in any event is as far as many business applications pro-
ceed. In a few cases attempts could be made to attach at least rudimentary
probabilities and weights to the decision tree. The emphasis should be,
however, on fully enumerating the likely actions and events and on
establishing the correct decisional sequence. Only after that is done would
estimates of time and resources be made.
A modest "first cut" of this type might attract the interest of experienced
trial lawyers aware of the perennial optimism that often abounds at the early
stages of a case and which can result in underestimation of duration and
complexity of litigation. Moreover, even limited DTA analysis might help to
correct the tendencies to take an overly short time perspective.
Further, following a general approach suggested by Brown,3 9 it might be
possible to run an experiment on one or more cases. Two separate legal
teams would review the file and make independent recommendations, one
using conventional methods and the other working with the assistance of a
DTA analyst. Assuming the case is prosecuted, a later study could be made
to see how reality compared with estimates and where, and if possible why,
estimates tended to deviate.
Second, applications of Bayes' Theorem to assess the impact of in-
vestigatory information on particular issues might be made in specific cases41
with consent of the trial staff. If lawyers find the method useful one would
expect increased utilization, just as has occurred in business.
Third, in the work of the Antitrust Division as a whole, budget prepara-
tion might utilize a conceptual DTA tree, but it may be more realistic to first
test whether the method can be utilized successfully in smaller scale applica-
tions.
CONCLUSION
Following the marked success of one of his proteges, it has become in-
creasingly fashionable to quote Admiral Rickover, and he is far from an ad-
mirer of decision theory methods. He warns that their use can freeze our
resolution:
"'A "conceptual tree" charts the decisional alternatives and paths without attempting to fix
quantitative weights and probabilities at all points. See Brown, Do Managers Find Decision Theory
Useful? 48 HARv. Bus. REv. 78, 82 (May - June 1970).3 9See R. BROWN & S. WATSON, ISSUES IN THE VALUE OF DECISION ANALYSIS, DDI TECHNICAL
REPORT 75-79 (Off. Naval Research 1975).
"
0Bayes' Theorem is simply the quantitative method or formula for revising probability
estimates based on subsequent information. See note I supra for a general description of the
method and citation to sources.
4"For an interesting example of how this was attempted by one DTA analyst on a single
issue before the FCC, see Park, A Bayesian Framework for Thinking A bout the Role of Analysis
in THE ROLE OF ANALYSIS IN REGULATORY DECISIONMAKING 57-61 (1973).
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On a cost-effectiveness basis the colonists would not have revolted against
King George III, nor would John Paul Jones have engaged the Serapis with
the Bonhomme Richard, an inferior ship. The Greeks at Thermopylae and at
Salamis would not have stood up to the Persians had they had cost-
effectiveness to advise them .... 42
But Professor Horowitz may be right after all. Lawyers are different. As in-
curable addicts of judicial opinions, they are apt to keep reading and apply-
ing decisions whatever the DTA analysts advise. The dangers of applying
decision theory in the Antitrust Division seem minimal.
2 Quoted in H. RAIFFA. DECISION ANALYSIS 270 (1968).
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